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ASHBEL S~flTH AND THE MEXICAN STEAMERS
STANLEY SIEGEL
E,"ery casual student of diplomacy of the Civil War is familiar with
the crisis resulting from the construction of Confederate Hironclads" in
British shipyards. After threatening the most serious consequences. Charles
Francis Adams on behalf of the Union was able to stop the practice, but
not before the A labama. Florida, S1uHlandoah and others had done much
damage to Northern Shipping. As minister, Adams readily admitted the
arguments which he relied upon in his discussions with the Foreign
Office had already been clearly stated by Ashbel Smith while representing
the Republic of Texas as Minister to England and France.
\Vhe" in March, 1842, Smith left to take up residence in London, he
had no inkling of what would pro\"e to be his chief concern. His instruc-
tions, draCted by Secrelary of State Anson Jones, stressed the necessity of
securing Quick ratification oC a treaty oC amity and commerce between
England and Texas and of an agreement providing for the mutual sup-
pression of the African sla\·e trade. Most importantly, Smit.h was to work
for friendly British mediation in the donnant military struggle between
the Republic and Mexico which was threatening to grow hot once again.
Matters of relatively minor importance which should engage his attention
were the recognition of Texas by Spain and encouragement to emigrants
from England, France, Gennany and Belgium who might wish to settle
in Texas. l
Once settled at London, Smith approached hi.s work in a pessimistic
mood. Writing to James Reily, the Republic's charoe d'affaires in the
Uni.ted States, Smith complained:
til have found Texas in exceeding bad repute here. We come in
for an ample share of the dislike held for every American-
besides our own sins we have to answer Cor. The Anti-Slavery
feeling pre-vades every class and is very active. The sympathy of
the English people and the present interests of English com-
merce are in Cavor of ~Iexico.'~
The diplomat was also distressed because of his belief that British policy
was basically p~:Mexican in that England would prefer to see a strong
Mexico as a counterweight to the United States. Perhaps overstating
the case, he also seems to have felt. that the Earl of Aberdeen, the
Foreign Secretary, was personally unfriendly.
Less than a month after Smith took up residence in London, a con-
tract was negotiated between Thomas Murphy, Mexican minister to Great
Britain, and the shipbuilding firm of Lizardi and Company. The con-
tract specified that two vessels of war would be builtj the Guadaloltpe
was to be constructed in the company's yards at Liverpool and would
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be completed first, and the Montezuma would be built at London to be
delivered later. Both were to be iron war-ships of advanced design for
that time. Although it was not specified as such in the contract, it was
understood that the crews would be recruited in England and the ships
would be commanded by officers in the British navy who had secured leaves
of absence for that express purpose.- British holders of Mexican bonds,
some of whom were enthusiastic abolitionists, were the securities of the
Mexican Embassy at London for the building of the naval craft.·
Smith cUd not refer to the vessels in his first audience with the Earl
of Aberdeen, but he was already enough concerned about the question
to mention it in his initial dispatch to his own government. Noting that
he would wait until ratification of the treaties had been completed, he
indicated that at that point he would protest the construction of the
ships. Should this prove ineffectual, Smith then felt that "imperative pru-
dence" cUctated the establishment of a blockade of the Mexican coast to
prevent the steamers from reaching their destination.5 A blockade, never
continuously effective, had actually already been established by the Re-
public as part of the troubled military situation in 1842.
On May 31, Smith in an interview with Aberdeen officially requested
that the government intervene to prevent the construction of ships for
Mexican use. Disclaiming any knowledge of such activity, Aberdeen re-
plied that a fonnal protest on the matter would not be favorably received.
Apparently Smith also received the impression that the Foreign Office
would have no objections if the Republic made arrangements for ves.-
sels to be employed against Mexico. In the diplomat's eyes, the govern-
ment appeared anxious to curry favor with the shi~buHders at any cost.'
Not content with merely filing objections, Smith detennined on some
private sleuthing. Writing to Anson Jones, he gave this careful descrip-
tion of his activities:
One of these Steamers called the Montezuma is lying in one
of the India Docks near London. Strangers are not pe.nnitted
to visit her. I however examined her pretty closely and carefully
on the 29th May. She measured upwards of one thousand tons
burthen, draws about 10 feet of water, is very stout and admir-
ably constrncted as a vessel of war. I think we have no vessel
in our navy which single handed could cope with the Montezuma
if well officered and appointed.T
Although Smith was unable to go to Liverpool, his enthusiasm for
keeping watch on the shipbuilding activities did not flag. Getting in
touch with a "Mr. Russell," whose son had recently returned from Texas,
the Minister was soon receiving reports of the Guadaloupe. According
to his infonnant, she was a "fonnidable vessel, superior to the finest
built by Mr. Laird.." As for annament, "her two deck guns are. on swivels--
fore and aft-and 69 pounders, and I observed on the deck a row of balls
as large as a good sized pumpkin.'" Smith also learned that the Guad·
aloupe would be commanded by a British officer, recently promoted. for
gallantry, who had considerable experience with iron vessels.
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Repeated protests to the Foreign Office ultimately resulted in the first
official statement of the British position. Aberdeen insisted that his gov-
ernment had no real connection with the outfitting of the ships and that
a request to ann and equip them in British ports had been refused.
However, he pointed out that n3\'81 craft, once constructed., were simHar
to any other form of merchandise and could be sold to any country. The
Foreign Office also maintained that the purchase and export of anns was
lawful, and that sailors might enlist to serve in the navys of any nation.
Officers who pursued such a course, however, did so at the risk of losing
their commissions.& Smith, calculating Aberdeen's repeated denial of any
official connection with the construction of the vessels, decided against
pressing the point at this time.
Instead the Texan changed his strategy. Writing to a member of the
opposition in Parliament, mith requested that the matter be brought up
in a formal question, thus subjecting the actions of the Foreign Office
to debate and scrutin)'. Tn addition to this, Smith enlisted the aid of his
colleague, the United States l\Jinister Edward Everett, in future audi-
ences with Aberdeen. Such assistance was forthcoming. though it was
never particularly enthusiastic. Finally, legal counsel was engaged in
the event that political and diplomatic pressure should prove futile.
Richard Cobden, noted friend of the Union during the Civil War,
agreed to raise the question of the steamers in Parliament. Tn response
to his query, Sir Robert Peel replied for the go\·ernment. He acknowl-
edged that two vessels were being fitted out for the service of Mexico, but
indicated that a request that they be manned with British seamen and
commanded by British office.rs had been rejected. Peel stressed that if
hostilities did break out again between the Republic and Mexico, it was
the government's intention to maintain a strict neutralit)". The debate did
not generate much excitement on either side, but Smith felt that the
tone of some anti-slavery statements made during the session indicated
a general bias toward Texas. 1o
The information which Smith received (rom his solicitors was equally
gloomy. In their opinion any effort to prevent the sailing of the ships
would eventually fail. They recognized that the statement of ownership,
which listed the steamers as belonging to British subjects until the ves-
sels arrived in Mexico, was only a subterfuge, but this fact alone would
not prevent the departure of the ships. Within the meaning of the For-
eign Enlistment Act, the Guadaloupe and Montezuma were private prop-
erty and unarmed, and even though it might be known that they were
destined for Mexican use, the British Government had no legal right to
interfere.
On September 13, 1842, legal arguments were heard seeking to prevent
the Montezuma from embarking from the yards at London as a viola-
tion of the Foreign Enlistment Act. A decision was soon reached j the
ship was allowed to sail, but only after her crew had been reduced and
her guns had been taken off. Smith believed that the Montezuma would
be followed by another vessel, and once the ships had gotten safely out
to sea, the military stores would be placed on board again and the size
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of the crew increased. The diplomat lamented the decision of the Lords
of the Treasury as a "mere farce," and since the Guadaloupe had pre-
viously sailed from Liverpool unchallenged and "armed to the teeth,"
all Smith's efforts appeared to have been to no avaiI.11
Nevertheless, the envoy doggedly continued to press his case. Writing
to Aberdeen shortly after the adverse finding, Smith insisted that the
removal of the annament and the reduction of the crew of the Monte.
Z1una would serve no real purpose since deception would be practiced.
He claimed that the violation of British law had been purposeful and
not unintentional, as had been alleged in the judicial proceeding, and
observed that since armament had to be removed as a condition prece-
dent to sailing, there had been an admitted violation from the very
beginning in the anning of the vessel.12
Aberdeen's reply was significant in that for the first time there was
an admission that Her Majesty's Government might be partially at Cault.
He noted that the purpose of the Foreign Enlistment Act was not to
give enemy nations the right to check each other's warlike designs and
preparations in British ports, but to give the government the power o'C
controlling the acts of its own subjects in regard to foreign powers.
However, Aberdeen emphasized that the statute conferred upon the Crown
a discretionary power to detennine whether an infraction was serious
enough to warrant action in the courts. Here was an inference that a
violation of the statute may have occurred, and that the Foreign Office
was remiss in not urging prosecution.u Perhaps seeking to compensate for
his derelict performance, Aberdeen infonned Smith that if alter the ves-
sels reached Mexican waters they should take on the character of ships
of war and cease being merchant craft, then the officers in command
would be recalled and dismissed from the British service. This pledge was
of little comfort once the steamers had been cleared for departure.
At this juncture Smith's patience was further tried by the arrival in
England of James Hamilton. This curious figure of Texan diplomacy
bore the title HGeneral" because oC his role in the South Carolina secession
crisis of 1832, when he was temporarily placed in command of the state
militia. He had made the cause of Texas his own and was a sincere
friend of the Republic, but his interfering nature caused him to be
cordially disliked by many. Immediately upon coming to London he in-
terested himself in the question of the ships. Writing to Aberdeen dur-
ing the litigation concerning the Montezuma, he urged that the Admiralty
be instructed to intercept the Guadaloupe which had already sailed. Ham-
ilton stressed that the latter vessel represented a more flagrant offense
under the Foreign Enlisbnent Act since it had begun its voyage with
its annament all mounted on deck and with no effort made at conceal-
ment. Angered at this meddling, Smith rejected all personal communica-
tion with Hamilton, and to the latter's suggestion that letters of marque
be issued authorizing the capture of the Guadaloupe, the answer was a
curt reIusal.
However, this did not contain the impetuous Hamilton. On his own
authority he published a manifesto to the "Senior Officer of Her Majesty's
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Navy on the Cuba station at Havanoah" stating that the Gua.d-
a.loupe was a legitimate prize even though she had been cleared by Cus-
toms. It would be easier to capture her, Hamilton cautioned, if the vessel
were allowed to pass the Morro Castle and was thus beyond the inter-
ference of Spanish authorities. The effort would be well worth it since,
"She cost u£80,ooO-a bona /ide valuable and sure prize if you strike at
once."H
Hamilton was also writing at this same time to Secretary of State
Anson Jones. One can imagine the shock to Smith's diplomatic aplomb
when Hamilton's letter was forwarded to him and he read of a plan,
'lior procuring one of the fastest iron steamers in the United Kingdom
... throwing an adequate crew on board of her, as soon as the MontezumQ.
cleared the Channel, to lay her aboard, and carry her by Boarding pike
and Cutlass."u Fortunately for Smith's sanity this was the final instance
of intervention on Hamilton's part. Losing interest in the question, he
returned to Texas shortly thereafter.
Once the Guadaloupe had been permitted to sail, Smith concentrated his
efforts on preventing the departure of the Montezuma. In successive
audiences at the Foreign Office, Smith stressed the following contentions:
(1) that England had insisted on compensation for damages oone to British
shipping by privateers outfitted in the United States in 1793; (2) that the
United States had held Americans who served in such privateering crews
to be indictable under the law; (3) snd" that England, herself, in 1829 had
refused to allow Portuguese subjects to proceed on unarmed ships bound
for Portugal to take part in an uprising there.1' The Texas envoy was
convinced that these historical precedents sustained his position, but
Aberdeen remained obdurate. Though detained for a month by Treasury
officials, the Mon.tezumCl was then permitted to sail, stripped of most of
her equipment, .and the crew reduced to meet the requirements of an ordi-
nary mel'chant vessel. l1
Throughout this period of steady agitation, Smith seems to have had
little encouragement from President Houston. Other matters, such as the
controversy over the permanent location of the capital of the Republic,
and the wisdom of an offensive campaign across the Rio Grande, crowded
in on the Chief Executive's attention. In Houston's only known comment
on the affair, he observed that perhaps the Minister had been over-zealous
in his actions. There is a tone of gentle chiding in Houston's awareness that
it would be impossible to coerce the British into a recognition of their
responsibilities as a neutral power. The President noted that when dealing
with the British, the foUowing was a good rule to adopt: "When we get
our hand in the Lion's mouth, my rule is to get it out, just as easily as
Possible, but not to strike the Lion on the nose."I' The mild approach in
Houston'a letter must have led Smith to feel that he had expended too
much time and effort on a cause that was destined to turn out unsuc-
cessfully.
In retrospect, however, the diplomat from Texas believed that his labors
had been of some consequence. Speaking to the members of the Galveston
Historical Society in 1876, he apparenUy still had the matter on his mind.
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Referring to the trouble-filled year of 1842, Smith pointed out that condi-
tions in the Republic had been most grave. Financial difficulties and internal
political factionalism would have made Texas a likely victim if there had
been a vigorous Mexican attacL But, as Smith informed his listeners:
uMexico was not ready. Serious delay had been imposed on the sailing of
the war steamers-restrictions had been laid on their commander~-when
at length these vessels reacl1ed Vera Cruz, they were not anned, supplied,
manned and officered, as it had been arranged they should be."IB Though
Smith may have o\'eremphasized the importance of the steamers to the
proposed Mexican war effort in 1842, there is no doubt that his persistence
and tenacity served the Republic well.
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